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DAVID L. GHERE
ASSIMILATION, TERMINATION, OR TRIBAL 
REJUVENATION: MAINE INDIAN AFFAIRS 
IN THE 1950s
The conclusion of the French and Indian wars brought an 
end to a long period in which Maine Indians played an inde­
pendent role in the state’s history. After nearly a century of 
warfare only the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy tribes re­
mained intact on tribal land, and most of this land was subse­
quently ceded to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts by trea­
ties in 1784, 1786, and 1818. By right of colonial precedent 
Massachusetts administered the affairs of the Penobscot and 
Passamaquoddy tribes until 1820, at which time this adminis­
tration was transferred to the newly formed State of Maine. 
Between 1830 and 1860, factional disputes within both tribes 
made it impossible for the tribal governments to function. 
During this chaotic period, the state and its agents accrued 
more and more control over the Indians and finally imposed 
compromises to resolve the most divisive issues. Although tri­
bal factionalism wained after 1860, the state did not return any 
authority to the tribal governments. For the next century, a 
state agent handled Indian affairs in accordance with the 
Indian laws in the state legal code with little or no consultation 
with tribal leaders, who were unable to regain any of their 
previous authority. State policies were predicated on the 
assumption that the tribes would gradually disintegrate as 
individuals chose to leave the reservation and enter into the 
surrounding society.1
The 1960s saw a decisive change in the conduct of Indian 
affairs, and indeed a change in the Indians’ own determination 
to exert themselves in state politics. By 1965, state policy makers 
no longer assumed that the tribes would surely disintegrate, 
and Maine became the first state to establish a Department of 
Indian Affairs. Late in the decade the Passamaquoddy tribe,
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joined subsequently by the Penobscot tribe and the Maliseet 
band in the Houlton area, gained nationwide attention by 
initiating federal lawsuits that resulted in one of the largest 
Indian land claims settlements in American history. The Indi­
ans’ political resurgence won them a sizeable cash settlement, 
large additions in tribal real estate, and hopes for a stronger 
hand in shaping their own destinies.
The beginnings of this political reawakening can be traced 
to events in the 1950s. Early in the decade young Indian veter­
ans of World War II infused the tribes with a better under­
standing of white society and a stronger interest in Indian 
culture and heritage. A more distinct source of Indian unity, 
however, came from outside political forces. Seeking to speed 
assimilation of individual Indians into white society, state 
administrators introduced legislation to terminate the tribal 
governments and the reservations themselves. The termination 
threat galvanized support — at least temporarily — behind the 
new tribal leaders, who were able to block the objectives of the 
state administrators. Ironically, it was the crisis brought on by 
proposals to dissolve tribal political structures that laid the 
basis for increasing tribal authority and provided the ideas, 
methods, and spirit with which the tribes later successfully 
pursued their land claims cases.
Conflicts over personal issues, religion, education, and 
tribal leadership had been a political stumbling block for 
Maine Indians since the early nineteenth century. During the 
1820s and 1830s both tribes were split along kinship lines into 
factions labeled in both cases the Old party and the New party. 
Violent internal tribal disputes characterized the next few 
decades and prompted members of the Passamaquoddy New 
party to abandon their Pleasant Point reservation and establish 
a new village in Indian township, seventy miles away. A series 
of compromises initiated by the state in the 1850s and 1860s 
finally resolved the most divisive issues. For the Passama­
quoddy Indians, for instance, these included alternating tribal 
elections between the two reservations. The disputes gradually 
became less emotional; an increasing number of Indians
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Maine Indians in the twentieth century. Above: the Indian Island ferry about 
1920, with the Penobscot Indian reservation in the background. Below: a 1932 




became independent of either faction and, ultimately, the for­
mal political parties were disbanded.2 Divisiveness, however, 
remained characteristic of tribal politics.
A second political stumbling block was the state’s percep­
tion of its responsibility toward the two tribes. State adminis­
trators viewed Indian affairs as a problem of individual rather 
than tribal welfare. From 1933 to 1965, Indian administration 
was the responsibility of the commissioner of health and wel­
fare, a doctor of medicine. Under his guidance, a single Indian 
agent (two after 1952) administered state policy as a social 
worker in the Bureau of Social Welfare. Hiram Hall, who 
served in this position from 1946 to 1965, had previously been a 
fish inspector for the Department of Fish and Wildlife. The 
absence of any office or subdepartment of Indian affairs and the 
lack of relevant training and experience for the administrators 
of Indian policy was indicative of the state’s disregard for issues 
other than individual welfare. Furthermore, state investiga­
tions of Indian affairs focused almost exclusively on topics of 
health, housing, education, and welfare and showed no recog­
nition of the Indians as a political or ethnic entity.3 Agent Hall 
sought to interact with the Indians as individual welfare recip­
ients and avoided or ignored contacts with tribal leaders. His 
office discouraged traditional crafts and promoted off- 
reservation employment and residence. Those receiving special 
training under state auspices were required to pursue their 
trade in white communities. Although Hall was reasonably 
generous to the elderly or infirm, he was tightfisted with 
unemployed Indians who were reluctant to abandon the 
reservation.4
Traditionally, state regulations were predicated upon this 
individualistic approach to Indian affairs, the underlying 
assumption being that ultimately individual Indians would be 
assimilated into the larger population and that the tribes 
would be disbanded. Tribal membership by birth or adoption 
was officially limited to individuals who were at least one- 
quarter Indian. Those who moved off the reservation had to
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conduct an annual renewal process to maintain their member­
ship, while those who remained on the reservation were inelig­
ible to vote in local, state, or national elections. Free hunting 
and fishing licenses (a treaty right) were awarded only to indi­
viduals if both parents had been Indians. Education on the 
reservations was supervised by the adjacent local school sys­
tems and all classes were taught in English. A law adopted in 
1941 denied tribal status to anyone whose spouse was less than 
one-quarter Indian. This policy, which would have dissolved 
the tribe in a generation, was so severe that it was repealed in 
1947.5
Tribal governments in 1950 consisted of a few spokesmen 
who had no authority to make decisions. Although each tribe 
elected a governor, lieutenant governor, and a legislative repre­
sentative every two years, these leaders were denied the respon­
sibilities routinely exercised by similar officials in white com­
munities. Indigent relief, street repair, zoning, building codes, 
schools, parks and recreation, canine control, and law 
enforcement were all administered by the state. The Indians 
had no control over the leasing of their reservation lands. Nor 
did they control the funds generated from these contracts. In 
fact, the Passamaquoddy had no decision-making power what­
soever, while the authority of Penobscot leaders was limited to 
the adoption of new tribal members. The Penobscot governor 
had been allowed to select the operator of the Old Town-Indian 
Island ferry, but in 1945 this prerogative was given to the 
commissioner of health and welfare. Each tribe also had a 
council of leaders to advise the governor, but these remnants of 
traditional Indian governments were not even recognized by 
the state until 1967.6
Despite minuscule official responsibilities, however, some 
Indian leaders became effective spokesmen and political organ­
izers, able to influence official policy through personal corres­
pondence, petition drives, and the drafting of legislation. The 
role of the tribal legislative representatives best illustrates the 
Indian leaders’ ability to exercise informal power by utilizing
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the tribes’ few remaining privileges. Traditionally, tribal 
representatives had been assigned seats in the state legislature 
and could join in debate, although they were not allowed to 
initiate legislation or vote. In 1941 their seating and speaking 
privileges were removed and they were reduced to the status of 
observers. Still, the representatives were able to inform their 
tribes of upcoming legislation and provide advice on dealing 
with the state bureaucracy. Moreover, they lobbied with state 
leaders for or against particular bills and enlisted the help of 
legislators to submit tribal proposals.7
Despite the active lobbying efforts of tribal legislative 
representatives and other Indian leaders, state agencies stepped 
up the campaign for assimilation in the late 1940s and early 
1950s. These efforts reflected a new mood in American society 
at large. Military success in World War II, economic prosperity, 
scientific advances, a fervent belief in the advantages of democ­
racy, and a perceived absence of social problems all contrib­
uted to a nationwide feeling of optimism and self-congratula­
tion. From an ethnocentric white perspective, Indian policy in 
the 1950s could do no better than to speed the assimilation of 
individual tribal members into this larger prosperous and 
democratic world. Many state administrators considered the 
continued maintenance of poverty-stricken reservations dis­
graceful; Indians were encouraged to discard their tribal 
structures and culture and embrace the rights, privileges, and 
economic advantages of white society.8
The acceptability — indeed inevitability — of tribal disin­
tegration permeated all aspects of Maine Indian policy, which 
was to be “directed toward a more complete assimilation” of 
Indians into society, with the “ultimate goal”of doing away 
with the tribal reservations. Regulations were designed to 
promote these ends, and any enhancement to the tribal 
governments’ organization or authority was perceived as an 
obstacle. In sum, state policy concerned only the individual 
needs of the 632 Penobscots living on the Indian Island reserva­
tion and of the 607 Passamaquoddies occupying the reserva­
tions at Pleasant Point and Peter Dana’s Point. Tribal matters,
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as such, were not considered, and those Indians residing off the 
reservation were assumed to be already integrated into white
society.9
The goal of assimilation was attractive to many Indians as 
well as to whites. Certain factions in both tribes sought even­
tual integration into white society and supported the general 
goals and conduct of state policy. They viewed welfare pro­
grams as a form of dependency and urged stricter limitations. 
They believed the state's responsibility was best limited to 
welfare for the aged, infirm, and needy and opposed efforts to 
expand the administrative bureaucracy.10 On the other hand, a 
small but influential nucleus of reformers in each tribe voiced 
strong opposition to the state assimilation policy and advo­
cated fundamental increases in the autonomy and authority of 
the tribal governments. They too resented the Indians’ status as 
welfare cases and pointed out that state “aid” was derived from 
the Indian trust funds or the leasing of Indian lands. The 
reformers advocated a new Department of Indian Affairs, 
which would deal with Indians as a distinct ethnic group.11
The controversies over assimilation and tribal autonomy 
divided the Penobscot tribe along the factional lines remaining 
from the old nineteenth-century disputes. The nucleus of active 
Penobscot reformers were descendants of Old party members, 
and the principal leaders all belonged to the extended family of 
the party’s founder, John Neptune. The reformers were primar­
ily Baptist and, like their ancestors, objected to the influence 
of the Catholic Church, particularly on the reservation schools. 
Those who defended the state's assimilation policy, on the 
other hand, were generally Catholics and, like their New party 
ancestors, wanted to limit the state's role in their lives. The 
reform group, although its members constituted only about 20 
percent of the tribe, was far better organized than their oppo­
nents, and their arguments, influence, and (according to their 
critics) intimidation secured the election of their partisans to 
the top tribal positions from 1948 until 1962.12
The geographic separation of the Passamaquoddy parties 
resulted in a different situation, with the two Passamaquoddy
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reservations each split into opposing factions by the 1850s. The 
Passamaquoddy factions were delineated in large part by their 
relationship with the Indian agent. Families that benefited 
from Hiram H all’s authority and welfare distribution gener­
ally defended state policy and administration, while those that 
did not were either critical or indifferent. Interestingly, whereas 
Penobscot reformers were descended from the Old party, 
Passamaquoddy reformers were most successful among resi­
dents of Indian Township, who were descendants of New party 
members.13
Nevertheless, the bulk of each tribe showed no strong 
allegiance to either faction. Depending upon the issue and the 
persuasiveness of the arguments, the division of political sup­
port for each group could vary. The tribal governor, no matter 
which faction he represented, was inevitably opposed by a large 
portion of his tribe. This discord limited the effectiveness of 
Indian spokesmen and contributed to the confusion of those 
whites sympathetic to Indian problems.14
Passamaquoddy reform leaders proved to be less effective 
in state politics than their Penobscot counterparts. The 
depressed economic conditions around the Passamaquoddy 
reservations increased the Indians’ dependence upon Hall’s 
assistance. More importantly, the alternation of elections 
between the two reservations prevented any continuity in Pas­
samaquoddy leadership. Also, the legislative session com­
menced only two months after the tribal elections; new officers 
had little time to acquaint themselves with the mechanics of 
state government.
Policies designed to accelerate the pace of assimilation in 
the late 1940s brought protests from Indian leaders and the 
beginnings of a coherent Indian reform movement. Consider­
ing the importance of the agent in both state policy and tribal 
politics, it is not surprising that early reform efforts focused on 
replacing Hiram Hall. The Passamaquoddy, led by Represen­
tative George Stevens of Indian Township, sent five petitions 
requesting Hall’s dismissal to the state governor between 
December 30, 1948, and February 1, 1950. The Penobscots dis­
patched a similar petition in March of 1949 and later voiced
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their complaints to John Welch, assistant to Governor Freder­
ick G. Payne. Both tribes were highly critical of H all’s abusive 
language, arrogant attitude, arbitrary use of authority, and 
preferential distribution of state aid. Many were angered by his 
refusal to attend tribal council meetings or to meet with tribal 
leaders. Furthermore, the Penobscots alleged that Hall ignored 
his obligation to remove white trespassers living on the 
reservations.15
The commissioner of health and welfare defended Hall 
and informed Governor Payne that the agent was to be com­
mended on the improvements in reservation conditions. 
Commissioner Stevens characterized H all’s actions as consis­
tent with the state’s assimilation policy and dismissed the dis­
satisfied Indians as ungrateful welfare recipients. Claiming that 
the only whites on the reservation were the spouses of Indians, 
Stevens suggested that the reform leaders were using the issue to 
intimidate members of the opposition faction. The governor 
accepted these rebuttals and took no immediate action. How­
ever, the Indian complaints did prompt numerous investiga­
tions into state policy.16
Official Passamaquoddy protests against Hall declined 
after this unsuccessful effort to secure his removal. In the 
October 1950 elections, the Pleasant Point reservation selected 
tribal leaders who were less critical of state policies and offi­
cials. The Penobscots, on the other hand, reelected reform 
leaders who continued to protest Hall’s refusal to remove white 
trespassers and initiated two unsuccessful legislative attempts 
to shift this responsibility to other state officials.17 The conflict 
between the Penobscot leaders and Hall was finally resolved 
after Penobscot Governor Albert Nicola voiced the tribe’s com­
plaints to the local news media in April 1952. Repeating the 
familiar charges, Nicola protested H all’s failure to consult 
with the tribe on Indian issues and claimed a “showdown” 
between the tribe and the state was imminent.18 This publicity 
prompted Commissioner Stevens to begin interviewing pro­
spective agents to replace Hall. Governor Payne, however, 
refused to dismiss an obligation to a loyal employee. Sadie 
Mitchell, a Penobscot favoring state policy, was appointed
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agent to her own tribe, and Hall was retained as Passama- 
quoddy agent, where he remained for the next eleven years.19
These same years saw a quickening of political activity in 
other areas as reform factions in each tribe sought to eliminate 
objectionable aspects of state policy through legislation. Start­
ing in 1949 the tribal councils sent a series of bills to the 
legislature. The proposals were discussed and ratified by the 
council and given to the tribal representative, who arranged for 
a legislator to submit them. While there was little coordination 
between the three reservations in formulating these bills, the 
two Indian representatives usually cooperated closely in 
Augusta.20
Although all of the reform efforts during these early years 
failed, they brought a growing awareness among tribal leaders 
of the need for political autonomy. Legislative attempts to 
secure the tribes’ perceived treaty rights, in fact, enjoyed wide­
spread support among the Indians and focused the attention of 
tribal leaders on the origins of Indian privileges in the original 
treaties with Massachusetts and Maine. These treaties, for 
instance, had repeatedly promised the unhindered “privilege of 
fishing, hunting, and fowling.” However, the final Passama- 
quoddy treaty (1794) only mentioned fishing while the last set 
of Penobscot treaties (1818, 1820) failed altogether to address 
the topic.21 The Indians claimed that they had never relin­
quished these privileges, while the state countered that omis­
sion of the game rights in the later treaties relieved the state of 
any obligation. In 1951, 1953, and again in 1955 the Indians 
had legislation introduced to extend free hunting and fishing 
licenses to tribal members previously denied this right due to 
mixed parentage. The proposals were defeated in all three 
legislatures.22
Another treaty right claimed by many Indians was free 
medical care. It is unclear how this perception originated, as 
the topic was not discussed in any of the treaties. Nevertheless, 
the numerous medical bills and accompanying letters received 
by Commissioner Stevens during the late 1940s and early 1950s 
clearly indicate that many Indians shared this belief. The state’s
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rejection of this point of view prompted unsuccessful legisla­
tive efforts to mandate state medical aid for all Indians.23
The most persistent treaty conflict with the state concerned 
the loss of land reserved for Indian use. The Passamaquoddy 
tribe had never received the islands in the St. Croix River prom­
ised in the 1794 treaty because Massachusetts had sold them 
prior to the treaty. The Penobscots lost the Penobscot River 
islands above Mattawamkeag because the State of Maine mis­
interpreted the provisions of the 1818 treaty. Additionally, in 
1833 the Penobscots were defrauded of four townships reserved 
for them. Twice during the late 1800s the Indians tried to resolve 
these problems but to no avail. State confiscation and sale of 
reservation land during the late 1940s and early 1950s triggered 
a new Indian initiative when the tribes proposed a commission 
to examine various individual and tribal land claims. In 1955, 
the legislature rejected this proposal too, but the continuing 
agitation for reinstitution of original treaty rights laid the 
foundation for stronger land claims in the next decades.24
In contrast to the widespread support on issues of treaty 
rights, the tribes divided into factions on most of the other 
legislative reforms. The most important of these proposed the 
creation of a state Department of Indian Affairs. This would 
have transferred authority from the state’s welfare-minded 
administrators to a new agency focused on (and, presumably, 
more responsive to) the full range of Indian problems. How­
ever, a separate state agency for Indians and a recognition of 
their nonwelfare concerns would have contradicted the policy 
of individual assimilation. Thus this bill was defeated when it 
was submitted in 1949, 1953, and 1955.25
The Penobscot reform faction assumed a leading role in 
efforts to enhance tribal government authority. All of its efforts 
were defeated, however. Proposals that would have allowed the 
tribe to appoint its own constable and to license reservation 
dogs were offered to the legislature in 1951 with no success. A 
bill transferring the duty of recording Indian deaths from the 
agent to tribal officials was likewise voted down. Two years 
later, the state legislature refused to allow the Penobscot tribal
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council to conduct the annual census. Also, when the Indians 
were finally given voting privileges in 1955, the administration 
of the reservation precincts was entrusted to adjacent town 
governments rather than to tribal officials.26
The most important request made by the Penobscots con­
cerned control over leasing their lands and the expenditure of 
the resulting funds. Governor Nicola considered jurisdiction 
over Indian lands the major vehicle for increased tribal auton­
omy. As matters stood, the state placed revenue from timber 
harvests on reservation lands in a special tribal trust, which the 
legislature could allocate for reservation improvements. Tradi­
tionally, the interest from these funds had been used by the 
agent to provide welfare. However, after 1945 the interest was 
deposited in the state treasury, and subsequent welfare pay­
ments assumed the appearance of state aid.27 Between 1949 and 
1953, the Penobscots attempted in various ways to gain control 
over the funds. After several attempts to reroute the funds 
through the tribal governments, in 1953 the Indians drafted 
two bills that would have distributed all funds generated from 
Indian land evenly to each tribe member. This proposal too 
was rejected by the legislature.28
The Passamaquoddy were somewhat less active on these 
issues of tribal authority. They did support the proposals for 
tribal appointment of constables and tribal control over trust 
funds, and Tribal Governor William Altevater (an indepen­
dent) sought unsuccessfully to impose a curfew and a dog tax in 
1955. However, Passamaquoddy reform energies were spent 
primarily on the continuing battle with Agent Hall. Criticisms 
voiced repeatedly throughout the period suggest that the cam­
paign from Pleasant Point made little headway.29
This litany of denied reforms appears to portray the Maine 
legislature of the early 1950s as conservative, dogmatic, and 
resistant to change. In actuality, the legislature questioned 
state policy and initiated three separate investigations. Repre­
sentative David Fuller was dispatched to the Institute on Amer­
ican Indian Assimilation and returned with numerous sugges­
tions for promoting assimilation of individual Indians. Frank
250
MAINE INDIAN AFFAIRS
Haynes, director of social welfare, conducted a lengthy study of 
state policy and expenditures going back to 1821. Lastly, 
Commissioner Stevens evaluated the reservations and recom­
mended methods of improving living conditions and speeding 
the assimilation process. Concurrently, Governor Payne 
initiated two separate evaluations of the Penobscot tribe’s griev­
ances, which emphasized the internal tribal dissension and 
portrayed the Indian reformers as an insignificant minority 
faction. In addition, Commissioner Stevens brought the state’s 
actions and policies to the attention of the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs in Washington and sought their advice. The agency 
congratulated Stevens on his conduct and confirmed the con­
currence of state and federal Indian policy.30
That none of the above reports seriously questioned over­
all state policy is a testimony to the pervasive feeling during the 
decade that assimilation into white society was the enlightened 
and progressive course for Indian affairs.31 On the rare occa­
sions that Indian affairs received attention from newspaper 
editors, individual assimilation and tribal termination were 
inevitably the themes. On January 11, 1956, for instance, the 
Portland Press Herald claimed, “The goal [of state Indian 
policy] should be eventual first-class citizenship for the Indi­
ans, placing on them the same privileges as everyone else. The 
reservation has no place in this civilized age.”32 In fact, inde­
pendent reports issued by the Indian Rights Association, the 
Portland Catholic Archdiocese, and the Maine Council of 
Churches’ Social Action Committee either endorsed the state’s 
practices or indeed urged more rapid assimilation.33
All of these reports were considered by a Legislative 
Research Committee on Indian Affairs during the 1951-1952 
legislature. This committee’s findings wholeheartedly em­
braced assimilation/termination while focusing primarily on 
issues of welfare. To expedite the assimilation process, the 
committee advocated state purchase of reservation lands, revi­
sion of certain state laws, and education of Indian children in 
nearby white schools. The Penobscot proposal for a state 
Department of Indian Affairs was rejected, but the committee
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recommended that Commissioner Stevens be authorized to 
appoint a Director of Indian Affairs within the Department of 
Health and Welfare. The legislature enacted this proposal dur­
ing the 1953 session, but Commissioner Stevens and his succes­
sor, Dean Fisher, chose not to make the appointment. The 
position appeared on government “line and block” charts, but 
in fact no change occurred.34
One reform recommended by nearly all of the reports and 
investigations was the granting of voting rights to the Indians. 
In response, the Maine Legislature extended suffrage in 
county, state, and national elections to the reservation Indians 
in 1955, being the next to last state in the nation to do so. 
However, Indian reaction to this reform provides another indi­
cation of the dissension within the tribes. Passamaquoddy 
Governor William Altevater praised the act as “one of the best 
things that has ever happened” and recognized voting as an 
important privilege and a potential means for improving his 
tribe’s welfare. The majority of Penobscot leaders, on the other 
hand, recognized that the small number of Indian voters, split 
as they were, would have little impact on the elections. Further­
more, some feared that the state government might claim that 
Indians were adequately represented by the new voting privi­
leges and attempt to abolish the tribal governments.35
The assimilation/termination program was advanced 
significantly in late 1954 when Dean Fisher, a doctor of medi­
cine, was appointed to replace David Stevens as Commissioner 
of Health and Welfare. Fisher endorsed assimilation and 
claimed that state policies, coupled with educational oppor­
tunities, economic pressures, and intermarriage, would even­
tually bring an end to the tribal reservations. Fisher pursued 
this objective aggressively, encouraged by the general 
ethnocentricism implicit in public attitudes toward the Indi­
ans. His aims were augmented by a comprehensive review of all 
aspects of state government initiated by Governor Edmund S. 
Muskie in 1956 and conducted by the prestigious Public 
Administration Service of Chicago. The section on Indian 
Affairs concurred with the state’s practice of administering
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Indian affairs through the Bureau of Social Welfare, but casti­
gated the state for the “squalor” in which many Indians lived 
and “for allowing the reservation system to continue into mod­
ern times.” The Public Administration Service urged a more 
aggressive policy “to abolish the reservation segregation sys­
tem and absorb the Indian population into normal community 
life.” It suggested that restricted eligibility for reservation 
rights and the elimination of some of the state’s treaty com­
mitments might be conducive to this goal.36
Armed with these recommendations, Commissioner 
Fisher proposed a series of resolutions to the legislature in 1957 
that would have reduced tribal membership and discouraged 
residence on the reservation. One would have transferred 
authority over tribal adoptions from the Indians to the state 
governor and council. Another sought to repeal the state 
requirement to return destitute Indians to the reservation. A 
third would have disallowed the inheritance of reservation land 
and eliminated the means for nonreservation Indians to retain 
their tribal status. Still another bill sought to empower judges 
with discretion to remove individuals (Indian and non-Indian) 
from the reservation.37
Far more controversial, however, was Fisher s proposal to 
eliminate both the reservations and the tribal governments. 
This new termination policy was to be accomplished by con­
verting the reservations into unorganized territory and by 
repealing various laws which distinguished between Indian 
and white residents. Persons residing in each area would then 
be governed equally — tribal members and white trespassers — 
according to the laws for unorganized territories. These new 
governments would replace the tribal governments. Many tri­
bal leadership positions were specifically cited for elimination, 
and, as unorganized territory, the unoccupied land would be 
open to purchase by anyone.38
Fisher s legislative proposals encountered unified opposi­
tion from the Indians. Several months earlier both tribes had 
elected members of the reform factions to the positions of 
governor and legislative representative. The state’s termination
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policy angered these leaders, but, more importantly, it alien­
ated many Indians who had previously endorsed the state 
policy of gradual assimilation. Consequently, a large majority 
in each tribe supported the leaders’ strident opposition to 
Fisher's proposals. This rare consensus gave the new reform 
leaders an effectiveness no Indian leader had previously en­
joyed.39
The Indians were first informed of Fisher’s plans by their 
legislative representatives in late January 1957. During the 
following weeks both tribal councils conducted lengthy discus­
sions concerning the proposals and strategies for defeating 
them. Both tribes drafted petitions to Governor Muskie and to 
the legislature attacking the new policy and objecting to the 
lack of consultation with the Indians. The tribal councils 
exchanged observers to coordinate their actions and the tribal 
representatives increased their lobbying efforts.40 Indian lead­
ers sought the support of state religious organizations, and in 
early March the Penobscots hired a lawyer to argue their case 
before the legislature. Just prior to legislative hearings on the 
bills, the two tribes held a joint news conference to publicly 
protest state policy. After explaining the implications of 
Fisher’s bills, various Indian leaders voiced stern opposition to 
the state’s effort to “abolish 1,200 people and set them adrift.”41
The Penobscots responded to the termination crisis by 
initiating some proposals of their own. One bill sought to 
strengthen tribal authority by transferring responsibility for 
appointing Indian constables from the state governor to the 
tribal governors, while another would have authorized the use 
of $4,000 of tribal funds to defend Indian rights. In addition, 
they endorsed Fisher's bill granting judges discretion to remove 
individuals from the reservation, but recommended an amend­
ment to require the appropriate tribe’s recommendation. This 
would not only shift authority to the Indian leaders but might 
also serve as a means of eliminating white trespassers.42
All of Fisher's proposals and those initiated by the Penob­
scots were referred to the legislature’s Joint Standing Commit­
tee on Welfare. A delegation of Indians representing both tribes
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The above occasion marks the first meeting of the Coalition of Eastern Native 
Americans, held November 1972 in Washington, D.C. Delegates to the gath­
ering included Passamaquoddy, Penobscot, Micmac, and Maliseet Indians. 
Smithsonian Institution.
and all political factions presented their views to the committee 
on March 26. Penobscot Representative John Nelson charged 
that the state proposed "to liquidate the entire tribe as a 
nation.” Passamaquoddy Representative George Stevens con­
demned the state’s refusal to cooperate with tribal leaders on 
Indian issues. Taking a different tack, Penobscot Councilman 
Leo Shay claimed that assimilation was inevitable but should 
be accomplished through education rather than abolition of 
the reservations. Some leaders claimed to be seeking only to 
postpone legislation for further consideration; another bluntly 
ordered the legislators to "leave our laws alone.”43
Penobscot attorney James Murphy presented a more for­
mal argument to the committee — an argument that foreshad­
owed the land claims of the 1970s in both scope and appeal. 
Murphy claimed that the tribe was “a free nation and a free 
people, subject to certain treaty obligations,” and that the state 
could "not legislate unilaterally as to the Penobscot nation, its 
lands or its existence.” Requesting a moratorium on the bills,
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Murphy threatened to appeal to President Eisenhower, Con­
gress, or even the United Nations. He closed by claiming that 
the tribe would ‘‘take any and all peaceful steps necessary to 
preserve their nation as a free nation, their people as a free 
people.”44
The Indians were not the only ones heard by the commit­
tee. Commissioner Fisher testified that the bills only elimi­
nated obsolete or conflicting laws which had been passed dur­
ing the previous century. Codification, he argued, would make 
the reservations eligible for additional state funds. Its intent was 
‘‘to make the Indians full-fledged citizens with the same rights 
as other citizens.” On the other hand, Frederick Payne, ex­
governor of Maine, claimed that since the bills concerned the 
Indians’ land and lives, the committee should listen to them. 
This view was echoed by a few religious leaders whose support 
had been recruited by the Indians.45
The unity of Indian opinion and the effectiveness of their 
tactics, which included petitions, testimony, lobbying efforts, 
publicity, and recruitment of non-Indian supporters, won over 
the legislature. In early April, all of the legislation that the 
Indians had opposed was either withdrawn or reported unfa­
vorably out of the welfare committee. Moreover, the committee 
endorsed changes that would permit tribes to appoint consta­
bles and require tribal approval before a judge could remove an 
individual from the reservation. However, the committee 
rejected the allocation of tribal funds to defend Indian rights. 
The tribal representatives continued their lobbying efforts and, 
in late April, secured passage of the two proposals approved by 
the committee. The legislature rejected all the remaining legis­
lation in accordance with the welfare committee’s recom­
mendations.46
The defeat of Commissioner Fisher’s initiatives elimi­
nated the threat of termination, but the state policy of individ­
ual assimilation remained intact. Welfare administrators con­
tinued to perceive the Indians only as welare recipients and the 
Indian agents continued to ignore tribal leaders, discourage 
tribal crafts, and promote emigration from the reservations. 
Fisher opposed further legislative reforms in the early 1960s
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and complained that the press focused too much on Indian 
problems. Indians, he argued, received “more assistance than 
ordinary welfare cases.” Hall agreed that the Indians had “a 
better set up than white people,” and revealed that he kept “the 
food down so that they [would] try to work.”47
The campaign for tribal autonomy was far from over. The 
termination crisis had radicalized a number of Indian leaders, 
particularly among the Penobscots. Spokesmen began to refer 
to themselves as “the Penobscot Nation” and to dispute the 
state’s right to pass legislation affecting them. Two lengthy 
Penobscot council meetings in late May 1957 were devoted to 
the tribe’s rights as a nation and to strategies for regaining 
tribal sovereignty. During the following months, the Penob­
scots changed the tribal governor’s title to tribal chief and 
began referring to Indian Island by its Penobscot name, Bur- 
nurwurbskek. In September, Chief Ranco informed the state of 
the tribe’s desire for separate-nation status, and the following 
May delegates to the United Nations were selected. Although 
patently unacceptable to the state, such actions suggest a remark­
able change in Indian attitudes following the termination 
crisis.48
The firm Indian consensus that had emboldened tribal 
leaders in the late 1950s gradually disappeared as the threat of 
termination receded. Some Indians may have been alienated by 
the radicals, while others simply resumed their traditional 
support of gradual assimilation. By the early 1960s, the two 
tribes were again evenly divided over opposition to state poli­
cies. In a bitter 1962 political contest, a one-vote majority 
elected a new Penobscot governor who was a vigorous defender 
of state policies. The Passamaquoddy governor, on the other 
hand, proved to be so critical of state policies that numerous 
tribe members launched a campaign for his removal. This 
discord was exacerbated by the fact that each tribe’s legislative 
representative held views opposite those of his respective 
governor.49
Although the drive for tribal autonomy was temporarily 
eclipsed by resurgent factionalism, Fisher’s initiatives never­
theless marked a turning point in the legislature’s attitude
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towards the Indians. Gradually over the next few years the 
legislature began to respond to the demands of the Indian 
reformers. The two Penobscot proposals enacted during the 
termination crisis were followed in 1959 by the extension of free 
hunting and fishing licenses to all members of either tribe. 
Four years later, the Penobscot government was authorized to 
pass and enforce local ordinances and to utilize the funds 
generated from dog licenses and automobile taxes on their 
reservation. The following legislature extended most of these 
powers to the Passamaquoddy tribe.50
Creation of the Maine Department of Indian Affairs in 
1965 confirmed the legislature’s growing distance from the 
policies of termination and forced assimilation. The agency 
had been recommended by a legislative research committee 
whose report acknowledged that most Indians took “pride in 
their blood and heritage and desire[d] to remain Indians.”51 
The research committee expressed doubts that the tribes would 
ever disintegrate or that individual Indians would become fully 
assimilated. It also criticized past legislatures for ignoring 
many Indian grievances while concentrating on welfare issues. 
The committee recommended that the state provide “every 
assistance” for tribal members “to advance in all facets of living 
... [while retaining] their identity as Indians.”52
There were, of course, broader reasons for the Indians’ 
legislative successes during the early 1960s. The national civil 
rights movement, the proliferation of white liberal Indian 
advocates, and a shift in the assumptions and perceptions of 
white society all played a role in the gradual abandonment of 
an active assimilation policy. But state and tribal politics, 
charged by the tensions of the termination crisis, carried their 
own dynamic as well. April 1957 marked both the last legisla­
tive efforts to undermine tribal integrity and the first enactment 
of Indian-sponsored reform legislation.
Historians of American politics have labeled the 1950s a 
“crucial decade,” a time of subtle changes that blossomed into 
lively political debate later in the 1960s and 1970s. During the 
1950s the Maine Indians successfully defended their tribal
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integrity and reservation land when they were in the greatest 
peril. This victory was largely due to the tribal representatives 
at the legislature, unique to Maine, who alerted the tribes, 
organized effective opposition, and utilized their legislative 
contacts to secure the defeat of Fisher s designs. Moreover, the 
1950s was an important gestation period for the ideas, methods, 
and tactics that the tribes used later to resolve important politi­
cal grievances. During the 1960s, a series of Indian sponsored 
legislative initiatives to enhance tribal authority, expand eligi­
bility for treaty rights, and create a Department of Indian 
Affairs was enacted into law. All of these reforms had their 
origin in the tribal council meetings and the defeated legisla­
tive resolutions of the early 1950s.
Indian tribal leaders like Passamaquoddy Governor John Stevens pushed to 
liberalize state adm inistration of the two reservations. The reform issues of 




The Maine Indian land claims had more direct connec­
tions with this crucial decade. The issue had been raised repeat­
edly in the tribal council meetings and in defeated legislation 
during the 1950s and early 1960s. The state’s reluctance to 
consider this grievance, coupled with a new incident, 
prompted the Passamaquoddy to seek a judicial resolution in 
the late 1960s. The two principal leaders of this effort, John 
Stevens and George Stevens, had been Passamaquoddy gover­
nor and representative, respectively, during the termination 
crisis. When the Penobscots initiated their own case in 1971, 
they were led by Governor Francis Ranco who had held that 
same position fourteen years earlier when he had argued 
against Fisher’s proposals before the legislature. Other leaders 
of both tribes had been council members or youthful observers 
in the 1950s, and this shared experience was the basis for their 
decisions concerning the land claims issue. Ultimately, after 
lengthy legal and political maneuvering, the key judicial deci­
sion, Passamaquoddy vs. Morton, in effect ruled that the fed­
eral government should have had authority over Indian affairs 
in Maine, not the state government. Without discounting the 
enormous effort and the imaginative legal tactics required of 
the Indians’ lawyers to win this case, this contention had been 
voiced repeatedly during the 1950s by the reform factions in 
both tribes.
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